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I. INTRODUCTION

The Fifth Amendment grants the privilege against self-incrimination.'
This privilege is implicated when the government compels a person to
answer a question that incriminates him and the answer is used against him
in a future criminal proceeding.2 While there are some situations that are
inherently coercive, generally the privilege must be invoked.3 This
privilege has been made applicable to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4
While persons who are incarcerated or under supervised release such as
probation or parole do not have the same freedoms as other citizens, the

1. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V (declaring the right not to be compelled to bear

witness against oneself in a criminal case).
2. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984) (explaining that a
person retains the right to refuse to answer questions that can incriminate him in any
proceeding).
3. See id at 429-31 (declining to extend Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), to questioning by probation officers because such questioning lacks the
inherent coerciveness implicit in custodial interrogation).
4. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1964) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment prevents the states from compelling confessions by exerting influence over
a suspect in such a way that the confession is not free and voluntary).
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Supreme Court has never held that such persons lack constitutional rights.'
Persons under supervision do, however, have diminished constitutional
-6
rights.
This Comment argues that court ordered polygraph testing as a condition
of probation violates the Fifth Amendment when the probationer is not
allowed to invoke the privilege with regard to statements that may result in
a revocation of his probation. Part II of this Comment explains the
standard courts use to determine whether the privilege has been violated.
Part III argues that the privilege must apply even when probationers are
immune from a future criminal prosecution because the consequence of
revocation of probation for invocation of the privilege is sufficient to
compel a person to incriminate himself.8 Part IV discusses commentators'
policy argument that the goal of rehabilitation outweighs protection of the
Fifth Amendment privilege of probationers, and rejects the argument that
concerns about recidivism are a weighing factor in the Fifth Amendment
analysis.9 Finally, Part V concludes that when polygraph testing is a
condition of probation, the results of such testing and the probationer's
invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination should remain known
only to the polygraph examiner and the probationer's therapist in order to
avoid a constitutional violation. o
II. BACKGROUND
A. ConstitutionalRights ofProbationers

In Morrissey v. Brewer, the Supreme Court announced that a parolee has
a Due Process right to a hearing, as soon as possible after his arrest for a
parole violation, to determine whether there is probable cause to believe the
5. See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 36 (2002) (plurality opinion) ("The privilege

against self-incrimination does not terminate at the jailhouse door."); see also Murphy,

465 U.S. at 426 (announcing that a person who is incarcerated or on probation retains
the right not to have his compelled answers to questions used against him in another
criminal proceeding).
6. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (holding that where a
state has a regulation providing for warrantless search of a probationer's home,
searches conducted pursuant to the regulation are valid so long as they are reasonable).
7. See infra Part II (discussing that the courts apply a Fifth Amendment analysis
to determine whether a probationer's privilege against self-incrimination has been
violated).
8. See infra Part III (showing that courts are not uniform in determining when the
privilege against self-incrimination applies).
9. See infra Part IV (arguing that weighing concerns about public safety and
rehabilitation more heavily than the constitutional rights of probationers proves the
very necessity of the Fifth Amendment).
10. See infra Part V (concluding that polygraph testing is an important tool in the
treatment of sex offenders but should be limited only to therapeutic use).
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parolee violated his parole." The Court held that such a hearing must be
presided over by an independent decision maker.12 Further, the Court held
that if the parolee so desires, he is entitled to a parole revocation hearing to
show that the parole violation did not occur or to offer proof of mitigating
circumstances." In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the Court extended the right to a
revocation hearing to probationers.14
In 1987, the Supreme Court held in Griffin v. Wisconsin that a warrant is
not required to search a probationer's home when the search is carried out
pursuant to a valid state regulation that meets the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness requirement. 5 The Court stated that while probationers do
have valid liberty interests, those interests are conditional.16 The Court
justified the limited liberty interests of probationers by reasoning that
concerns about rehabilitation justified supervision as a special need of the
state, which permits an otherwise unconstitutional invasion of privacy.' 7
B. Fifth Amendment Rights ofProbationers
In Minnesota v. Murphy, the Supreme Court held that a probationer's
incriminating statements made to his probation officer during questioning
did not violate the Fifth Amendment because the probationer answered the
questions instead of asserting the privilege.' 8 In reaching this holding, the
Court relied on the fact that the probation officer did not expressly state
that invoking the privilege would result in a revocation of probation.' 9 The
Court determined that a violation would only occur if the probationer was
11. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483-85 (1972) (weighing the state
interest in returning the parolee to prison without the time and cost of a new criminal
trial against the liberty interests of the parolee and the societal interest in
rehabilitation).
12. See id. at 485-86 (reasoning that a parole officer may not always be able to
make such decisions objectively because his relationship with the parolee may
positively or negatively impact the parolee's position).
13. See id at 487-88 (explaining that such a hearing would not revolve around
whether there is probable cause to believe the parolee has violated his parole; rather,
the hearing would be used to determine whether such a violation warrants revocation).
14. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (holding that probation is a
similar form of conditional liberty as parole and, therefore, due process requires a
hearing).
15. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987) (finding that operation
of a successful probation system is a "special need" of the state, which negates the need
for the warrant requirement).
16. See id. at 874 (explaining that the liberty interests of probationers are
contingent upon probation restrictions).
17. See id. at 875 (observing that because supervision can reduce recidivism, it is a
special need of the state).
18. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (explaining that a
probationer cannot invoke the privilege with regard to voluntary statements).
19. See id. at 438 (arguing that it was unlikely Murphy felt compelled within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment because he freely volunteered other information).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol21/iss2/8

4

Fausset: Answer me or go to Jail: Why Court Ordered Polygraph Testing to T
2012]

ANSWER ME OR GO TO JAIL

459

forced to choose between making incriminatory statements or revocation of
his probation for invoking the privilege. 20 The Court suggested that if a
consequence of invoking the privilege is revocation, then use of the
statements in a future criminal proceeding would violate the Fifth
Amendment.2 1 In McKune v. Lile, however, a plurality of the Court
declined to strike down a Kansas statute that provided that statements made
by a prisoner during sex offender treatment could be used in a future
criminal proceeding.22
1. The Fifth Amendment Is Only Implicated When the Statements Are
Compelled
In McKune v. Lile, a plurality of the Court explained that the prisoner's
status must be taken into consideration in determining the extent of the
privilege against self-incrimination. 2 3 The plurality went on to define the
"atypical and significant hardship" test for determining whether the Fifth
Amendment rights of prisoners are violated when they invoke the
privilege. 24 Further, the plurality held that a sex offender treatment
program that required a prisoner to incriminate himself by admitting to past
crimes did not implicate the Fifth Amendment, because the consequence of
being moved from a medium-security prison to a maximum-security prison
for noncompliance with the program was not an atypical and significant
hardship.25
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor expressly rejected the "atypical
and significant hardship" analysis.26 Justice O'Connor describes the
20. See id. at 436 (noting that the relevant question was whether the condition of

probation requiring Murphy to be truthful with his probation officer in all matters
forced him to choose between waiving his privilege against self-incrimination and
incarceration for remaining silent).
21. See id. at 435 (explaining that when a probationer's answers can be used
against him in a criminal proceeding and the invocation of the privilege results in
revocation, the probationer is faced with the "classic penalty situation"). Contra
McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 45-46 (2002) (plurality opinion) (arguing that the penalty
situation does not have a place in Fifth Amendment analysis because the line between a
benefit and a penalty depends on the view of the prisoner).
22. See McKune, 536 U.S. at 35 (finding that the state statute, which did not grant
immunity to prisoners for their incriminating statements, did not run contrary to the
Fifth Amendment).
23. See id at 36 (explaining that the rights and freedoms limited by incarceration
must be considered in the Fifth Amendment analysis).
24. See id. at 37-38 (noting there is no violation of the privilege when the
consequences for invoking the privilege by not participating in a sex offender treatment
program involved transfer to another prison, but notably did not affect the prisoner's
chances of parole).
25. See id. at 38-39 (articulating that the prison transfer was not truly a
consequence for invoking the right, but merely served the State's penological interest
by keeping all prisoners who participated in the program in the same prison).
26. See id at 48 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the Fifth Amendment
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appropriate test for determining whether there is a Fifth Amendment
violation as being whether the penalty for invoking the privilege is so great
as to amount to compulsion. 27 In determining that the penalties in McKune
resulting from invocation of the privilege did not amount to compulsion,
Justice O'Connor reasoned that the penalties were minor and could be
imposed by prison disciplinary authorities for reasons other than invocation
of the privilege.28
Several circuit courts have treated O'Connor's concurrence in McKune
as controlling. 2 9 The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Antelope, construed
O'Connor's concurrence in McKune to require a court to apply a two-prong
analysis in order to determine whether the Fifth Amendment is implicated
when a probationer is incarcerated because he invoked his privilege against
self-incrimination. 30 The two-prong test requires the probationer to show
that (1) there is a risk of incrimination in the statements sought by the
government and (2) the penalty for invoking the privilege instead of
making the statements amounts to compulsion.3 1
2. The PrivilegeAgainst Self-IncriminationProtects Statements That Can

Be Used in a Future CriminalProceeding
In Antelope, the Ninth Circuit held that where probation was revoked
because of the probationer's refusal to participate in polygraph testing, the
revocation in and of itself is sufficient proof that his probation was
conditioned on an impermissible waiver of the privilege against selfincrimination during polygraph testing.3 2 In reaching this conclusion, the
Ninth Circuit explained that the Fifth Amendment privilege is not a broad
one and that a probationer cannot generally refuse to answer all questions
posed; rather, a probationer can only assert the privilege when there is a
compulsion standard is broader than the one adopted by the plurality).
27. See id. at 49 (acknowledging that while Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), does not apply outside of the custodial interrogation context, the analysis of
whether or not a situation results in enough pressure to compel a person to incriminate
himself still needs to be considered).
28. See id. at 52 (finding that a person would not feel compelled to open himself up
to criminal liability simply because he has an incentive to comply with prison rules).
29. See United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1133 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting
Justice O'Connor's concurrence was construed as controlling in Ainsworth v. Stanley,
317 F.3d 1(1st Cir. 2002), and Searcy v. Simmons, 299 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2002)).
30. See id. at 1133-34 (explaining that a "full-blown" analysis is required to
determine whether the Fifth Amendment privilege of a probationer was violated).
31. See id. at 1134, 1138 (applying the two-prong test and determining that
Antelope's probation was impermissibly revoked because of his invocation of the
privilege).
32. See id. at 1139 (noting the lower court's refusal to recognize that the
probationer had a right not to have his polygraph results used against him in a criminal
proceeding and that this violated his privilege against self-incrimination).
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real threat of criminal prosecution resulting from his answers. The court
reasoned that because Antelope had repeatedly invoked the privilege and
chose to suffer the consequence of incarceration rather than answer the
questions posed, the answers he was refusing to give must have been
incriminating. 3 4 The second prong of the analysis was met because the
court found revoking probation upon an invocation of the privilege was a
sufficient penalty to amount to compulsion.35
3. The PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination Does Not ProtectStatements

from Being Introducedat a ProbationRevocation Hearing
In United States v. Lee, the Third Circuit held that a probationer retains
the privilege against self-incrimination but that the privilege only applies to
answers that may be used against him in another criminal proceeding, and
not to questions with respect to the conditions of his probation. The court
explained that answers relating to violations of conditions of probation are
not compelled so long as those answers do not reveal conduct that is
Furthermore, the court stated that involuntary
otherwise criminal.
revealed by the polygraph when he invokes
probationer,
by
the
reactions
his privilege, cannot be used against the probationer if the invocation of the
*38
privilege is valid.
By contrast, the Second Circuit in United States v. Johnson found there
was no violation of the Fifth Amendment when the district court modified a
probation order to provide that the probationer could not invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination during polygraph testing even when the
answers could incriminate him in a future criminal proceeding.3 1 If the
33. See id at 1134 (analogizing that there is no violation when there is no threat of

criminal prosecution to a probationer just as there is no threat of criminal prosecution to
a witness when the statute of limitations has expired (citing Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S.
591, 596-97 (1896))).
34. See id. at 1135 (explaining that the polygraph exam required a complete
autobiography including any criminal offenses for which Antelope had not been
convicted).
35. See id. at 1137 (describing that imposing penalties for failing to make
statements that are not directly related to the offense for which the probationer was
convicted would render those statements compelled testimony).
36. See United States v. Lee, 315 F.3d 206, 213 (3d Cir. 2003) (reasoning that,
because there is no threat of future criminal prosecution for a crime which he has
already been convicted, the privilege only applies when the probationer risks answering
questions that relate to a crime other than the one for which he was convicted).
37. See id. (noting that Lee was asked questions regarding contact with minors and
internet usage).
38. See id (explaining that the probation office cannot use the reaction to justify
revocation of probation when the probationer had validly asserted the privilege).
39. See United States v. Johnson, 446 F.3d 272, 275 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that the
district court's order would allow Johnson to contest the introduction of statements at a
future proceeding).
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probationer was later prosecuted for a crime as a result of the answers to
such testing, he would retain the right to challenge the admission of those
statements.40 The court reasoned that revocation may be based on the
refusal to answer questions because such refusal interferes with the goals of
probation.4 1 In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the value of
polygraph testing in treating probationers, specifically the ease with which
such testing ensured compliance with the terms of probation. 42
In United States v. Locke, the Fifth Circuit determined that when a
probationer did not invoke the privilege against self-incrimination his
statements were not compelled under the Fifth Amendment.43 The court
further stated that polygraph testing does not create a coercive situation
because the probationer's statements cannot be used against him in a
The court affirmed the revocation of Locke's
criminal proceeding.4
probation based on the dishonest results of a polygraph examination that
lead to the search of his wife's computer, revealing the presence of
pornography.4 5
C. A ProbationerDoes Not Waive the Privilege Through a Plea Agreement
Which Utilizes Polygraph Testing as a Condition ofProbation
In Jacobsen v. Lindberg, the Court of Appeals of Arizona found that a
condition of probation that required the probationer to participate in
polygraph testing as part of a sex offender treatment program did not
constitute a waiver of the probationer's Fifth Amendment rights merely
because the probationer agreed to participate in such a program.46 Jacobsen
pleaded guilty to a charge of Luring a Minor for Sexual Exploitation and
40. See id. at 275, 280 (upholding the conditions imposed by the lower court

because the probationer was not deprived of the right to object to the inclusion of
incriminating statements in a future proceeding).
41. See id. at 279-80 (expounding that revocation for refusal to answer questions is
not a violation of the Fifth Amendment because the probationer is not being punished
for asserting his rights, but, rather, he is being punished for refusing to answer
questions (citing Asherman v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1992))).
42. See id. at 277 (explaining that polygraphs provide an incentive not to lie
without specifically noting that such incentive derives solely from the fear of being
incarcerated (citing Lee, 315 F.3d at 213)).
43. See United States v. Locke, 482 F.3d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding that a
probationer must assert the privilege if he wishes to have its protection).
44. See id. (explaining that the polygraph examiner's questions were attempts to
uncover probation violations and not evidence of other crimes).
45. See id. at 766 (noting that a court order was issued to search the computer
based on the probationer's dishonest polygraph results and that the district court
revoked his probation for that violation).
46. See Jacobsen v. Lindberg, 238 P.3d 129, 133 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (reasoning
that a probationer cannot waive the privilege by agreeing to the terms of probation
rather than facing punishment because one cannot be forced by a court to waive a right
under the Constitution (citing State v. Eccles, 877 P.2d 799 (Ariz. 1994) (en banc))).
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agreed to participate in psychological assessment. 4 7 The plea agreement
included participation in polygraph testing, and the trial court assured
Jacobsen that the privilege against self-incrimination was protected by
Arizona statute.4 8 He signed a waiver of confidentiality with regard to the
polygraph testing that stated that results of distressed polygraphs would not
be used in court or for revocation of his probation. 4 9 When Jacobsen
inquired what the result would be if he invoked his privilege against selfincrimination, the polygraph examiner informed him that invocation would
amount to a failure of the polygraph test for refusal to answer questions.5 0
The court determined that Jacobsen was entitled to invoke his privilege
except as related to the crime for which he had pled guilty.5
In reaching its decision in Jacobsen, the Court of Appeals of Arizona
52
In Eccles, the Supreme Court of
relied heavily on State v. Eccles.
Arizona, sitting en banc, construed Minnesota v. Murphy to stand for the
proposition that probation cannot be conditioned on a waiver of the
privilege against self-incrimination.5 3 The Jacobsen court went on to hold
that a probationer loses the privilege with regard to the offense for which
he was convicted, but retains the privilege with regard to answers that
could incriminate him in a future criminal proceeding.54
III. ANALYSIS
A. Though ProbationIs a Privilege,ProbationersRetain a Liberty Interest
That Prevents Revocation Without Due Process Under the Fifth
Amendment.

Although a person who is on probation has been convicted of a crime, he

47. See id. at 131 (clarifying that psychological assessment could be made through
polygraph testing or through penile plethysmograph testing).
48. See id. (explaining that Jacobsen had raised with the trial court a question of
whether the statute was sufficient to guarantee his Fifth Amendment privilege).
49. See id. (noting that upon signing the waiver, Jacobsen was made aware that his
probation officer would be informed of his polygraph test results).
50. See id. (stating that there is a failure of the polygraph when the examinee
refuses to answer a question for any reason).
51. See id. at 133 (implying there is no risk of future criminal prosecution for a
crime for which one has already pled guilty).
52. See generally id at 132-33 (finding that in State v. Eccles, 877 P.2d 799, 801
(Ariz. 1994) (en banc), the state supreme court had expressly ruled that probation
cannot be conditioned on a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination).
53. See Eccles, 877 P.2d at 801 (explaining that because Murphy prevents a state
from revoking probation for invoking the privilege, it stands to reason that a state
cannot compel a probationer to waive the privilege).
54. See id. at 801-02 (noting that the state may press for answers to questions for
which the privilege was invoked so long as it offers immunity).
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does not lose the protection of the Constitution. Probation is a privilege
that enables the probationer to serve out his sentence free from
incarceration so long as he remains compliant with the terms of his
release.56 A probationer has a liberty right to remain living in the
community so long as he continues to comply with the terms of his
probation.
Yet, even when a probationer does not fully abide by the
terms of his probation, he may still have an interest in retaining his liberty
to remain in the community.
Thus, probation cannot be automatically
revoked the moment a violation becomes apparent. 59 The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the probationer be
granted a hearing to determine whether his probation should be revoked for
a violation of the conditions of his probation.60
A probationer does not lose his right to invoke the privilege against selfincrimination by reason of his conviction of a crime. 61 A condition
requiring a probationer to have periodic meetings with his probation officer
in which he is required to answer questions truthfully does not
automatically mean those statements are compelled.62 A probationer
cannot simply claim that he was compelled; instead, he must show that
compulsion existed because he was forced to choose between making the
statements and incriminating himself, or being penalized for remaining
silent.63 Thus, a statement by the probationer is not compelled until he

55. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984) (stating that the defendant
does not lose Fifth Amendment protection because he was convicted of a crime); see
also McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 36 (2002) (plurality opinion) (declaring that even
prisoners are entitled to some Fifth Amendment protection).
56. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (noting that probationers do
not have the same degree of liberty as free citizens).
57. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (recognizing that probation
results in a conditional loss of liberty).
58. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1972) (enumerating two
questions that must be asked before revocation of parole: first, did the parolee violate
the terms of his release; and second, does the violation rise to a level for which the
parolee should be incarcerated).
59. See id. at 482 (noting that a parolee enjoys many of the same rights as a free
citizen, such as living with family, and therefore the revocation of parole is a loss of
liberty to the parolee).
60. See id. at 480-81 (explaining that a parolee has conditional liberty and is thus
entitled to some procedural due process protection from parole revocation).
61. See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 36 (2002) (plurality opinion) (explaining that
while restricted liberty interests are essential in determining the Fifth Amendment
rights of prisoners, such interests do not terminate the prisoner's Fifth Amendment
rights).
62. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984) (comparing the position of
a probationer to that of a witness under oath who may suffer penalties for lying but
cannot be punished for invoking the privilege).
63. See id at 434-35 (analogizing the rights of a probationer under the Fifth
Amendment to those of a witness at a trial).
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invokes the privilege and is required to answer the question without being
assured of immunity from future use of the statement."
Just as a witness on the stand during a trial retains the right to invoke the
privilege when his answers to a question may be used against him in a
future criminal proceeding, the probationer retains the right to invoke the
privilege when answers to questions posed by a probation officer may be
used against him in a future criminal proceeding.6 5 When a probationer,
like a witness, could have invoked the privilege but failed to do so, the
statements may be used against him in another criminal trial. 6 The only
way for a probationer to protect his statements when he failed to invoke the
privilege is to show that he was threatened with revocation if he did not
answer the questions posed.67
While probationers are entitled under Murphy to a grant of immunity for
compelled statements, states do not have to grant immunity from future
criminal prosecutions when participants in a prison sex offender treatment
program are subject to questioning that can produce incriminating
Where a state has legitimate penological interests in not
statements.
granting immunity to participants in the program, a statute that allows
future prosecution based on information obtained through the program is
valid. 69 Because successful sex offender treatment requires the offender to
take responsibility for all of his crimes, granting immunity for statements
about other crimes would absolve the offender of his other crimes. 70 A
grant of immunity would also preclude future prosecution when it is
determined that an offender has committed a more serious offense than the
one for which he was convicted, thus undermining the deterrent effect of
the program.'
64. See id. at 427 (stating that the Fifth Amendment is implicated when a witness is

forced to answer questions after claiming the privilege).
65. See id. at 426 (explaining that the privilege does not only apply to criminal
defendants in a trial who take the stand, but to all witnesses in official proceedings
whose answers may incriminate them in future proceedings).
66. See id. at 440 (concluding that because Murphy retained the right to invoke the
privilege but did not, his statements were not compelled).
67. See id at 435 (explaining that if a state implies invocation of the privilege will
result in revocation, the probationer will not be deemed to have waived it).
68. See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 35 (2002) (plurality opinion) (declaring that
if the state offered immunity then no Fifth Amendment claim could be made because
the prisoner would not face future criminal prosecution).
69. See id at 34 (noting, however, that Kansas has never brought a criminal
prosecution based on information obtained from the program).
70. See id. (arguing that if an offender believes he cannot be punished for admitting
a crime it follows that he will be led to believe the crime is not serious).
71. See id at 34-35 (outlining the dual purposes of the program as rehabilitation
and deterrence: rehabilitation is achieved through requiring an offender to admit his
crimes, and deterrence is achieved through the fear that other crimes will be discovered
through the program).
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The test of whether Fifth Amendment rights are implicated is whether
the consequences for a prisoner who participates in such a program, upon
invoking the privilege against self-incrimination in response to questions
posed by the program, constitute atypical and significant hardships in
relation to the inmate's daily life.72 The atypical and significant hardship
analysis allows courts to weigh the liberty interests of the prisoner with the
An inmate who is faced with the
interest of the state in rehabilitation.
prison if he does
a
maximum-security
to
possibility that he will be moved
not participate in the program is not faced with an atypical and significant
hardship because it is within the purview of prison administrators to move
inmates for any reason. 7 4 Conversely, if the inmate were to lose a number
of good behavior credits towards parole as a consequence for invoking the
privilege, it likely would constitute an atypical and significant hardship.75
If the loss of good behavior credits towards parole constitutes an atypical
and significant hardship under the McKune plurality, it is likely that the
revocation of probation would be seen as a deprivation of the liberty of the

probationer.7 6
B. The FederalCircuitCourts Have Not Fully Implemented Murphy in a
Way That Protects the Fifth Amendment Rights ofProbationersBecause
the Courts Have Failedto Insulate Probationersfrom Use of Their
Statements.
The Federal Circuit Courts have consistently accepted the rule of
Murphy that a probationer cannot be compelled to answer questions that
The courts have
would incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.
72. See id. at 37 (extending the Due Process test from Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472 (1995), which considers the already curtailed liberty of the prisoner, to cover Fifth
Amendment claims as well).
73. See id. at 37-38 (explaining that when state interests are related to the program,
those interests are weighed against the interests of the prisoner). Contra United States
v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that government interests
never outweigh the probationer's privilege against self-incrimination).
74. See McKune, 536 U.S. at 39 (noting that prison authorities are allowed to use
incentives to get prisoners to behave).
75. See id. at 38 (submitting that the consequences faced by the prisoner for
invoking the privilege were not as grave as a lengthier prison sentence or a reduction in
good behavior credits, and implying that such consequences would implicate the Fifth
Amendment).
76. See id. at 37-38 (explaining that the test is in relation to the life of a prisoner,
not to the life of an average person).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 482 F.3d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding
that where probation was revoked because of a probation violation, Murphy was not
implicated because the answers could not be used in a future criminal proceedings);
United States v. Johnson, 446 F.3d 272, 280 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding no Fifth
Amendment violation when the probationer still retained the right to challenge
introduction of the statements in a future criminal proceeding); Antelope, 395 F.3d at
1139 (concluding that the probationer was wrongly incarcerated for invoking the
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not, however, reached a consistent rule on how a probationer should be
protected from polygraph exam questions that will elicit an incriminating
response.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in McKune more closely
followed the Murphy line of reasoning than the plurality's hardship test.79
Justice O'Connor rejected the plurality's reasoning and applied the
traditional Fifth Amendment test of whether the penalty imposed is enough
to compel a person to incriminate himself.80 The distinction between the
two tests is small but significant. The "atypical and significant hardship"
test proposed by the plurality is a subjective approach that focuses on the
penalty faced by the inmate and how that penalty would impact his daily
life.
In contrast, the compulsion test proposed by O'Connor is an
objective approach that focuses on the penalty faced by the inmate and
whether such a penalty would compel the inmate to incriminate himself. 8 2
In essence, the plurality puts forth a theory that the presence of compulsion
is insignificant and only the harshness of the penalty matters.83 Because
the Court has not addressed the Fifth Amendment rights of probationers in
the context of court ordered polygraph testing, the lower courts are left with
two tests to choose from in determining whether the Fifth Amendment
rights of probationers have been violated.84 Indeed, lower courts have
already split over whether grants of immunity are required when
privilege with regard to statements that would implicate him in other criminal
proceedings).
78. Compare Johnson, 446 F.3d at 280 (finding that there is no protection during
the polygraph exam because the Fifth Amendment is not implicated until the
government introduces the statements at a future criminal proceeding), with Antelope,
395 F.3d at 1139 (finding that the probationer did not have to wait until the statements
were used against him because revocation based on the refusal to answer questions
without immunity violated the Fifth Amendment).
79. See McKune, 536 U.S. at 50-51 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that the
consequences of invoking the privilege involved changes in living conditions, not
changes in liberty).
80. See id at 49-50 (comparing the facts of McKune with those of the "penalty
cases," which involved significant economic detriment to the person who invoked the
privilege).
81. See id. at 37-38 (plurality opinion) (noting that because the Fifth Amendment
compulsion analysis must consider the context of the prisoner's daily life, the
consequences necessary to trigger the Fifth Amendment would have to be greater than
those which would ordinarily amount to compulsion).
82. See id. at 48-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (agreeing with the judgment of the
plurality that the program did not violate the Fifth Amendment because the
consequences for not participating in the program were not great enough to compel
self-incrimination).
83. See id. at 52 (noting that there are some penalties that may not constitute
atypical and significant hardships yet would still be viewed as coercive within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment).
84. See United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1133 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005)
(construing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in McKune as the narrowest, and therefore
controlling, opinion).
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questioning probationers can result in incriminating statements. 85
1. A Majority of the FederalCircuit Courts Have IncorrectlyApplied
Murphy in the Context of Court OrderedPolygraph Tests for Probationers
Because They Do Not ProvideAdequate Protectionto the Probationer
from Being Compelled to Choose Between Answering Incriminating
Questions or Revocationfor Remaining Silent.
In Johnson, the Second Circuit incorrectly determined that a probationer
cannot assert the privilege against self-incrimination.86 Though a probation
revocation hearing is an administrative proceeding and not a criminal
proceeding, the probationer still retains the right to be protected from the
use of his statements at a future criminal proceeding. While seemingly in
line with Murphy, the probationer must nevertheless be granted immunity
from the use of his statements at the time he answers-not, as the Second
Circuit would suggest, only when those statements are introduced in
another criminal proceeding. Suggesting that a probationer's statements
are protected only when he makes a Fifth Amendment claim at a future
criminal proceeding leaves the probationer subject to impermissible
derivative use of his statements.89 If he is offered no valid grant of
immunity before making the statements, there is nothing to prevent law
enforcement officials from beginning a new investigation against the
probationer where they would not have done so but for the probationer's
statements. 90 Thus, even though his statements will not be introduced at a
future criminal trial, there is a very real risk that the tainted evidence
obtained through the Fifth Amendment violation will be used against the

85. Compare id. at 1139 (holding that the lower court incorrectly revoked

probation when the probationer refused to answer questions without a grant of
immunity), with United States v. Johnson, 446 F.3d 272, 280 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding
that a probationer does not need to be granted immunity at the time he makes
incriminating statements because he retains the right to object to the introduction of
those statements when and if there is a future criminal proceeding).
86. See Johnson, 446 F.3d at 279 (explaining that probation may be revoked for
failure to answer incriminating questions).
87. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 (1984) (noting that while there
are due process requirements for revocation hearings, those hearings are not criminal
proceedings).
88. See Johnson, 446 F.3d at 280 (explaining that when probation is revoked for
statements which are incriminating, the probationer retains the right to challenge the
admission of those statements at a future criminal proceeding).
89. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429 (suggesting that immunity must be granted not
only for the use of the statements at a future criminal proceeding but also for use of the
fruits of the statements at a future criminal proceeding (citing Maness v. Meyers, 419
U.S. 449,473 (1975) (White, J., concurring))).
90. See Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1141 n.5 (explaining that the Fifth Amendment
requires that immunity be granted both to the use and derivative use of compelled
statements).
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probationer.9 1 Forcing the probationer to wait until the statements are used
against him in a future criminal proceeding, without granting him immunity
at the time the statements are made, subverts the rule of Murphy because
the probationer must be protected from revocation unless he is assured
incriminating statements will not be introduced at a future criminal
proceeding.92 The lack of immunity undermines the probationer's liberty
interest in remaining in the community because revocation functions as a
Furthermore, the
punishment for invoking a constitutional right. 93
probationer faces a serious risk that he will not be able to challenge the
admission of such statements into evidence because he did not invoke the
privilege at the time he made the statements. 94
The rule of Murphy is that a probationer may only invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination when the statements sought would incriminate
him for another crime. 95 A probationer cannot invoke the privilege with
respect to questions about his probationary status.96 Though the rules may
seem contradictory, that a probationer may be sent to prison when he
refuses to answer questions relating to the conditions of his probation even
when those answers would reveal a violation of his probation, but not when
those answers would reveal another criminal offense; the law in its current
form does not protect statements that only relate to the terms of probation. 97
Polygraph testing serves the purpose of ensuring compliance with the terms
of probation; therefore, a probationer's statements regarding the terms of
his probation are not protected.98 Because probation is a privilege,
91. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429 (equating failure to invoke the privilege with
making a voluntary statement for which the probationer cannot later claim his Fifth
Amendment rights were violated).
92. See id. (emphasizing that at the time a witness asserts the privilege, he must be
granted immunity before he is required to answer (citing Maness, 419 U.S. at 473
(White, J., concurring))).
93. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (explaining that while a
parolee is still subject to state supervision, his liberty is very different than that of a
prisoner, and he relies on and has a right to that liberty).
94. See, e.g., Murphy, 465 U.S. at 428-29 (articulating that because the Fifth
Amendment is not self-executing, when a probationer does not invoke the privilege he
is deemed to have waived it).
95. See id at 435 n.7 (observing that if a probationer were asked to answer a
question relating to a probation condition that is not otherwise criminal, he would not
be able to invoke the privilege with respect to that question).
96. See United States v. Lee, 315 F.3d 206, 213 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that the
privilege only extends to statements that could be used in a future criminal proceeding,
not to statements that reveal a violation of probation).
97. See United States v. Locke, 482 F.3d 764, 767 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating
that the probationer would not have been able to invoke the Fifth Amendment with
respect to the question about viewing pornography, for which probation was ultimately
revoked, because viewing pornography could not implicate him in another criminal
proceeding).
98. See United States v. Johnson, 446 F.3d 272, 277 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that
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probationers may find themselves restricted from otherwise lawful
activity.99
When polygraph examiners seek answers to questions relating to
restrictions on the probationer's conduct, the probationer retains no Fifth
Amendment privilege and probation may be revoked for an attempted
invocation of the privilege.' 00 This is because the Fifth Amendment
protects only those statements that would have an incriminating effect at a
future criminal proceeding, and statements regarding conduct that would be
lawful but for the condition of probation do not have an incriminating
Thus, even when a probationer is
effect in future criminal proceedings.'
faced with revealing information that could result in his return to prison, he
cannot invoke the privilege because such statements are not compelled
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.102
A separate issue arises when a statement reveals both a violation of a
probation condition and information that would be incriminating in a future
criminal prosecution.103 Many cases focus on questions that seek to elicit
4
statements regarding past crimes for which probation cannot be revoked.10
Complicating the analysis is that a common condition of probation is a
requirement not to engage in criminal activity; therefore, any questions
regarding the probationer's participation in criminal activity since being
placed on probation would necessarily indicate that the probationer has
both violated probation and committed a crime. 05 The rule suggests that a
the probationer's fear that the polygraph works is enough to prevent him from lying).
99. See Locke, 482 F.3d at 766 (permitting revocation when the condition of
probation prohibited use of the Internet and any viewing of pornographic material);
Johnson, 446 F.3d at 280 (permitting revocation when the condition of probation
prohibited direct and indirect contact with minors).
100. See Lee, 315 F.3d at 212 (noting that the state may revoke probation for refusal
to answer questions to which the privilege does not apply).
101. Cf Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.7 (1984) (hypothesizing that if
probation were revoked for statements revealing a failure to comply with residency
requirements, the Fifth Amendment would not be implicated because the privilege
extends only to criminal proceedings).
102. See Lee, 315 F.3d at 213 (comparing statements obtained through required
polygraph testing with statements made to a probation officer and finding no
difference).
103. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 ("The result may be different if the
questions[,] ... however relevant to his probationary status, call for answers that would
incriminate him . . . .").
104. See, e.g., id. at 423 (indicating that in an interview with a counselor, the
probationer revealed a rape and murder occurring prior to the conviction); United
States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that the probationer
was unwilling to discuss his sexual history because of fear of prosecution for previous
criminal acts).
105. See Antelope, 396 F.3d at 1130 (explaining that the terms of the probationer's
release required participation in the very treatment plan which he feared would require
disclosure of information that could incriminate him).
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probationer must, nevertheless, answer questions that would reveal activity
that is both criminal and a violation of probation and face possible
revocation of probation, but will also be protected from use of those
statements in future criminal proceedings.o 6
2. The Ninth Circuit in Antelope Closely Follows Murphy Through
O'Connor'sConcurrence in McKune, but Overlooks the Chance to
Determine How to Address Statements That Reveal Both CriminalActivity
and ProbationViolations.

The Ninth Circuit in Antelope correctly decided that because government
interests in rehabilitation do not outweigh the probationer's interest in
remaining on probation, the privilege may be invoked when the statements
would be incriminating in future criminal matters even if the statements
sought are relevant to probationary matters.' 0 7 The state has a valid interest
in overseeing the rehabilitation of probationers.' 0 8 That interest, however,
cannot be weighed against the probationer's privilege against selfincrimination.' 0 9 While the interests of the state may be taken into
consideration to determine punishment, the Constitution bars punishment
for the invocation of a right. 0 Because a probationer retains the right to
invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in all criminal matters other
than the crime for which he was placed on probation, the state may not
insist on answers to questions relating to other criminal matters without a
grant of immunity."' Thus, the court correctly determined that Antelope's
probation was wrongly revoked because he was not offered immunity from
future prosecution resulting from the statements that were sought.112
106. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 (suggesting there may be a different interpretation

when a statement reveals both a violation of probation and criminal behavior, but
failing to reach the issue).
107. See Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1134-35 (noting that even when questions are
relevant as to the terms of probation, the probationer retains the privilege if the answers
to those questions would incriminate him in future matters (citing Murphy, 465 U.S. at
435)).
108. See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 33 (2002) (plurality opinion) (explaining that
the rehabilitation of sex offenders is a valid state interest).
109. See Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1134 (stating, but not citing, authority for the rule
that government interests in rehabilitation do not outweigh the probationer's privilege
against self-incrimination).
110. See id at 1138 (explaining that Antelope's rights were violated because he was
incarcerated for invoking the privilege).
111. See id at 1140 (finding that a witness does not have to answer questions until
he is assured of protection from the use of his statements in future criminal proceedings
(citing Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 78 (1973))).
112. See id at 1139 (explaining that the district court's view that Antelope should
not be granted immunity for his statements placed Antelope in a Catch-22: forcing him
to choose between losing his liberty for answering questions or losing his liberty for
remaining silent).
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A probationer is protected from having his probation revoked when he
invokes the privilege against self-incrimination with respect to statements
that would implicate him in a future criminal proceeding.' 13 The privilege
against self-incrimination is available only where there is a threat of future
criminal prosecution. 114 This reasoning implies that a state may revoke
probation when a probationer asserts the privilege with respect to conduct
that can reasonably reveal only probation violations and not criminal
behavior."' When a probationer repeatedly refuses to answer questions by
invoking the privilege, and is willing to suffer the consequence of returning
to incarceration, there is a presumption that the statements he sought to
Revoking probation because of an
protect were incriminating.116
invocation of the privilege amounts to a longer prison term, which the
plurality in McKune suggested would be impermissible.' 17 The question
remains whether revoking probation over a statement revealing criminal
activity, even with a grant of immunity from use in future criminal
proceedings, impermissibly lengthens the term of incarceration.
3. The CourtsAre Unanimous in Finding That There Is No Violation of the
Fifth Amendment When a ProbationerAnswers IncriminatingQuestions
Instead ofInvoking the Privilege Because the Fifth Amendment Must Be
Invoked in Order to Be Claimed.
The privilege against self-incrimination is not a self-executing right." 8
The Court has carved out a few rare exceptions where a person may be
faced with a situation that is so coercive in nature that any statements made
are automatically inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment.1 19 In situations
where a person is faced with an inherently coercive environment, he is
entitled to a warning regarding the use of any incriminating statements in a

113. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 438 (1984) (reasoning that states
cannot revoke probation simply because a probationer invoked the privilege).
114. See Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1134 (explaining that the purpose of the privilege is
to prevent interrogation (citing Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596-97 (1896))).
115. See United States v. Locke, 482 F.3d 764, 767 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007) (indicating
that the probationer could not have invoked the privilege because his statement did not
reveal otherwise criminal behavior).
116. See Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1134 (noting that the privilege may be invoked only
when there is an actual threat of future criminal prosecution).
117. See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 52 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating
that the imposition of a longer sentence when a probationer refused to make disclosures
is unconstitutional).
118. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 433-34 (stating that a probationer cannot claim an
exception to the non-self-executing rule because the nature of a meeting with a
probation officer is not inherently coercive).
119. See id at 429-30 (explaining that custodial interrogation is so inherently
coercive that a suspect would feel compelled to answer all questions posed).
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future criminal proceeding.120 Thus far, the Court has declined to extend
the warning requirement to the administration of polygraph tests to persons

on probation.12 1
Courts have found that the setting for a polygraph exam is not
considered inherently coercive because the court ordered nature of the tests
does not amount to a level of compulsion that offends the Fifth
Amendment.122 Though a probationer is hooked up to a polygraph machine
during an exam, the test itself is not coercive in nature because the machine
can be unhooked.12 3 The belief that most probationers have that they are
obligated to complete the exam does not create a coercive atmosphere.1 24
Additionally, probationers should routinely expect questions related to
prior and current criminal history.125 Ultimately, a probationer's privilege
against self-incrimination is not violated unless he asserts the privilege and
is made to answer without a grant of immunity.126
Because the privilege against self-incrimination is not a self-executing
right, a probationer must invoke the privilege in order to be granted
immunity from the use of the statements against him in a criminal
proceeding.12 7 A probationer who fails to invoke the privilege cannot later
claim that the incriminating statements were introduced in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.128 Since failure to invoke the privilege means that a
probationer cannot raise a Fifth Amendment challenge when the statements
are introduced at a future criminal proceeding, the Second Circuit in
Johnson erred when it determined that a probationer could not invoke his
120. See id. at 430 (proclaiming that the well-known Mirandawarning was created
to curb the inherently coercive nature of a custodial interrogation).
121. See id. (observing that the Court has been reluctant to extend the requirement of
Miranda warnings and will not do so in the context of questioning by probation

officers because a probationer is not in custody as it is defined under Miranda
jurisprudence).
122. See id at 431 (finding that a required interview with a probation officer does
not create an inherently coercive setting for the probationer because the probationer
retains the right to invoke the privilege).
123. See United States v. Lee, 315 F.3d 206, 212 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that the
probationer can leave the room at any time he chooses with only minimal delay but
failing to note that refusal to take the exam is often a violation of probation).
124. See id (stating that staying through a polygraph exam is no different than
staying the full length of an interview with a probation officer).
125. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 432 (noting that part of the job of the probation officer
is to determine the criminal history of the probationer).
126. See Lee, 315 F.3d at 212 (noting that the setting of a polygraph exam does not
create a coercive environment).
127. See United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining
that a probationer must assert a specific and not a general intention not to answer
questions).
128. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 428-29 (expounding that failing to assert the privilege
is functionally the same as volunteering information, so one cannot raise the claim at a
later time).
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privilege during polygraph testing and instead had to wait and see if the
statements were introduced at a later criminal proceeding. 12 9 The Second
Circuit is alone in its view of Murphy that the privilege only applies when
the statements are introduced in a future proceeding. 130
C. The Arizona Court ofAppeals FurtherGuards the Fifth Amendment in
Jacobsen v. Lindberg by Disallowing the Derivative Use of the Statements
at Trial.
The court in Jacobsen correctly applied the rule of Murphy that a
probationer may not be compelled to answer questions that would
incriminate him in a future criminal proceeding when it held that a court
1
could not condition probation on a waiver of the Fifth Amendment.13 A
court conditions probation on a waiver of the Fifth Amendment when it
orders the probationer to undergo periodic polygraph testing as a condition
of probation and does not allow the probationer to retain the right to invoke
the privilege against self-incrimination during the polygraph exam.132 The
argument is that the probationer has, by accepting this condition of
probation, chosen to waive his Fifth Amendment right in lieu of
incarceration.133 To force this choice on the probationer at sentencing is,
however, the very compulsion that the Fifth Amendment prohibits. 13 4 A
probationer cannot waive his Fifth Amendment rights at sentencing when
he chooses probation because he is forced to choose between giving up the
privilege or incarceration.13 ' This is the very same choice he is faced with
129. See United States v. Johnson, 446 F.3d 272, 280 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that as

long as the probationer can challenge the introduction of the statements at a future
criminal proceeding, the statements are not derived in violation of the Fifth
Amendment).
130. See United States v. Locke, 482 F.3d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 2007) (explaining that
during questioning a probationer may invoke the privilege with regard to answers that
would incriminate him in a future prosecution); see also Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1134
(stating that the privilege must be invoked only when there is a threat of prosecution
from the statements); Lee, 315 F.3d at 212-13 (noting that statements that are
incriminating in a criminal proceeding are protected).
131. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 438 (articulating that it is a violation of the Fifth
Amendment for a state to revoke or even threaten to revoke probation because of an
invocation of the privilege).
132. See Jacobsen v. Lindberg, 238 P.3d 129, 131 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that
Jacobsen specifically inquired into the consequences for invoking his privilege against
self-incrimination and was informed that it would be a failure of the polygraph if he
refused to answer a question).
133. See id. at 133 (rejecting the argument that a probationer waived his Fifth
Amendment rights because polygraph testing was a term of the plea agreement).
134. See id. at 131 (restating the precedent of the Arizona Supreme Court that barred
probation conditioned on a waiver of the privilege).
135. See id. at 133 (explaining that allowing probation to be conditioned on a waiver
of the Fifth Amendment cannot be reconciled with the fact that a probationer cannot be
made to waive the Fifth Amendment during a polygraph exam (citing State v. Eccles,
877 P.2d 799, 802 (Ariz. 1994) (en banc))).
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when he is not allowed to invoke the privilege during polygraph testing. 13 6
While the court in Antelope implies that probation cannot be conditioned
on a waiver of the Fifth Amendment, only the Jacobsen court clearly states
the rule.3 7
Though the court in Jacobsen did not apply the "atypical and significant
hardship" test announced in McKune, the court would have reached the
same conclusion under this test.'38 Because Jacobsen was on probation and
living in the community, he therefore experienced many of the rights and
freedoms available to free citizens. 39 To remove Jacobsen from society
because he had invoked the privilege against self-incrimination would
drastically upset the balance of his daily life by thrusting him into
incarceration.14 0 There is a drastic difference between the punishment
rejected as not atypical and significant in McKune, and the punishment
faced by Jacobsen.141 Incarcerating a probationer who is enjoying the
freedoms of civilian life, such as holding a job and living with family,
differs drastically from moving a prisoner from medium- to maximum-

security prison.142
Jacobsen's plea agreement provided that he was to participate in
polygraph testing and the trial court determined that if an incriminating
question was asked, Jacobsen would be protected by statute.143 The
Arizona Court of Appeals found the statute was insufficient to guarantee
the full protections of the Fifth Amendment because it did not protect
136. Compare United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2005)
(holding that a probationer was impermissibly incarcerated for invoking his Fifth
Amendment privilege), with Jacobsen, 238 P.3d at 131 (holding that probation cannot
be conditioned on a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege).
137. See Jacobsen, 238 P.3d at 131 ("[A] waiver of the privilege against selfincrimination may not be made a condition of probation."); see also Antelope 395 F.3d
at 1135 (noting that treatment via polygraph testing placed Antelope at a "crossroads").
138. See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 37-38 (2002) (plurality opinion) (implying
that an extension of incarceration would constitute an atypical and significant
hardship).
139. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972) (holding that because
parolees have become accustomed to daily life in the community, revocation of parole
without a hearing deprives them of liberty without due process).
140. Contra McKune, 536 U.S. at 44-45 (plurality opinion) (explaining that taking
away benefits from a prisoner that were granted by the prison itself cannot be deemed
to compel a prisoner to incriminate himself).
141. Compare id (allowing a treatment program in a prison to take away television
and gym access), with Jacobsen, 238 P.3d at 131-32 (disallowing a treatment program
for a probationer to revoke probation).
142. See McKune, 536 U.S. at 51 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that the
prisoner still retained his fundamental rights to have family and clergy visits, and meet
with his attorney).
143. See Jacobsen, 238 P.3d at 131 (noting that Jacobsen had filed a Motion to
Preclude Polygraph Examination and Pre-Polygraph Questionnaire because he believed
the condition infringed upon his Fifth Amendment protection).
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probationers from the derivative use of their statements.144 By invalidating
the Arizona statute, the court in Jacobsen also protected probationers from
having their compelled statements used in future criminal proceedings as
evidence other than in the prosecution's case-in-chief.14 5 A statement
cannot be used against a probationer when it was derived in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.14 6 Without added protections, however, there is a risk
that evidence that is discovered as a result of those compelled statements
will be admitted into evidence.14 7 To provide probationers full protection
under the Fifth Amendment, they must be protected from all use of their
statements in criminal proceedings.14 8 Therefore, the result in Jacobsen
prevents the statements from being admitted into evidence in future cases
to show character, propensity, or other bad acts.14 9
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
The usual justification for ordering probationers to take polygraph exams
is that such exams reduce recidivism. 5 0 There is concern that allowing
5
probationers to invoke the privilege undermines the goal of treatment.1 '
Because honesty is necessary for effective treatment, a probationer should
not be allowed to keep information from his polygraph examiner.152 While
144. See id. at 134 (interpreting section 13-4066 to preclude only the introduction of

the statements, not other use of the statements by the prosecution (citing ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-4066 (2006))).
145. See id. at 133-34 (striking down section 13-4066, which allowed prosecutors to
admit into evidence statements obtained during polygraph testing that showed the
propensity of the defendant to commit sexual misconduct (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-4066 (2006))).
146. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429 (1984) (explaining that a person
must be granted immunity before he is required to answer questions that will
incriminate him (citing Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449, 473 (1975) (White, J.,
concurring in result))).
147. See Jacobsen, 238 P.3d at 131 (overturning the lower court which had granted
less than full immunity under a then valid statute).
148. See id at 134 (finding that a statute that does not grant full immunity as
required by the Fifth Amendment is invalid (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of
New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 54 (1964))).
149. See id. (explaining that section 13-4066 allowed evidence to be admitted under
Arizona rules of evidence, which in tum allowed for the introduction of otherwise
inadmissible statements to show propensity towards certain acts (citing ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-4066 (2006), ARIZ. R. EVID. 404)).
150. See, e.g., Angela Kebric, Comment, Polygraph Testing in Sex Offender
Treatment: A Constitutionaland Essential Tool for Effective Treatment, 41 ARIZ. ST.

L.J. 429, 438 (2009) (arguing that close monitoring is needed to keep the public safe
from sex offenders).
151. See Merrill A. Maiano, Comment, Sex Offender Probationersand the Fifth
Amendment: Rethinking Compulsion and Exploring Preventative Measures in the Face
of Required Treatment Programs, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 989, 999 (2006) (stating
that the threat of a polygraph exam revealing criminal activity is what deters
probationers from committing crimes).
152. See Kebric, supra note 150, at 435-36 (explaining that the fact that probationers
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the goal of effective treatment is admirable, it does not justify infringement
of a probationer's Fifth Amendment rights.'" If courts are allowed to use
rehabilitation as an excuse to ignore the constitutional rights of
probationers, what is to prevent courts from using crime prevention as an
excuse to ignore the constitutional rights of free citizens?
Because the current law already runs the risk of asking courts to weigh
policy concerns against constitutional protections, courts need to take
special care in determining how to approach cases where the statements
sought are both incriminating and reveal a violation of probation.154 A
statement arising out of past conduct is a non-issue, because the condition
of probation is only to refrain from future criminal conduct; thus the
appropriate action is to grant immunity from use of the statement in future
criminal proceedings.' 55 When the statement arises out of conduct after
probation has begun it can be inferred that immunity will be granted as to
future criminal proceedings, but the probationer will still face revocation
for violating probation. 15 6 The courts continue to hold that only those
statements that can be used in a future criminal proceeding are
incriminating.157 Even if a probationer is insulated from the use of his
statements in a future criminal proceeding, he is still faced with a coercive
choice: answer the question for which immunity has been granted and face
revocation for a probation violation, or refuse to answer the question for
which immunity has been granted and face revocation for failure of the
polygraph.' 5 8 This result leaves open the possibility that a probationer is
admit to more crimes while undergoing a polygraph than in regular interviews with

probation officers necessitates the use of the polygraph).
153. Accord United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating
that government interests do not outweigh the Fifth Amendment).
154. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 442 n.3 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority that the privilege only extends to future
criminal prosecutions, and instead advocating that the privilege requires absolute
immunity from any action taken by the state (citing Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S.
548, 562 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting))).
155. See id at 429 (majority opinion) (requiring that a probationer be assured at the
time the statements are made that the statements will not be used in a future criminal
proceeding).
156. See Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1135 (explaining that a probationer has a right to
invoke the privilege with respect to questions about criminal activity even where such
activity violates probation conditions, but failing to discuss whether probation can be
revoked after immunity is granted from use of the answers in criminal proceedings
(citing Murphy, 465 U.S. at 253)).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 315 F.3d 206, 213 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that
the privilege cannot be invoked with respect to questions where the answers sought
could not be the basis of a criminal prosecution).
158. Cf Jacobsen v. Lindberg, 238 P.3d 129, 133 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (holding
that a sentencing court cannot require a waiver of the Fifth Amendment before granting
probation; to do so would force the defendant to choose between going to trial for
another crime when it is revealed during questioning, or automatic loss of probation).
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returned to prison for the admission of a crime for which he was not
allowed to invoke the privilege, and for which he was not afforded an
opportunity for a trial, with only a due process right to a revocation
In effect, the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfhearing.159
incrimination is illusory as applied in the probation context.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Murphy has already taken the first step in
protecting the Fifth Amendment rights of probationers.16 0 The Ninth
Circuit in Antelope properly interpreted existing precedent when it applied
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in McKune to polygraph testing of
probationers.16 ' Together, Murphy and McKune protect probationers from
the threat of revocation when they invoke the privilege against selfincrimination during a polygraph exam with regard to questions that may
produce incriminating answers.1 62 The Court has not, however, chosen to
protect probationers from this same threat when the statements sought will
only reveal violations of probation. 16 3
Because rehabilitation is a legitimate government interest, polygraph
testing should be included as part of a treatment program.164 However, in
order to fully protect the Fifth Amendment rights of a probationer, the
results of the test should be kept confidential between the polygraph
examiner and the treatment program.' 6 5 This will automatically prevent
any risk to the probationer that his statements could be used against him in

159. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 441 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority

relies on the distinction between criminal and revocation proceedings in its
determination that the privilege only extends to the use of the statements in criminal
proceedings).
160. See id. at 435 (majority opinion) (concluding that a state cannot revoke
probation for invocation of the privilege).
161. See Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1138 n.4 (articulating an alternate reasoning for its
holding that revocation resulted in a longer prison sentence therefore violating the Fifth
Amendment, and finding that the probationer was placed in the classic penalty
situation).
162. Compare McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 53 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(arguing that there is a distinction between forcing a person to accept consequences of
his action and imposing on him a penalty for invoking the privilege), with Murphy, 465
U.S. at 435 (explaining that forcing a probationer to choose between remaining silent
and returning to jail or making the statements and facing prosecution creates a penalty
situation forbidden by the Fifth Amendment).
163. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 n.7 (drawing a line between statements that are
likely to reveal a criminal act and those that will only reveal a probation violation).
164. See McKune, 536 U.S. at 33 (explaining that offenders who are not truthful are
more likely to fail in treatment).
165. See Jacobsen v. Lindberg, 238 P. 3d 129, 131 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (setting out
in the facts that Jacobsen had been asked to sign a confidentiality waiver that enabled
the polygraph examiner to inform Jacobsen's probation officer of the exam results).
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a future criminal proceeding or be used to revoke his probation.166
Restricting knowledge of the statements to examiners and treatment
providers resolves any confusion the probationer may have over whether or
not he retains a right to invoke the privilege.16 7 This level of confidentiality
will ensure that the probationer's rights are not invaded while still
considering the government's interests in rehabilitation.

166. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 n.7 (arguing the difference between statements
that indicate a criminal violation and those that indicate a probation violation, and
assigning Fifth Amendment protection only to the former).
167. But see McKune, 536 U.S. at 35) (noting that allowing prosecution for
statements obtained through polygraph testing furthers state interests in deterrence).
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